Does limiting
one's investment universe limit the return on
a portfolio?
What do
the benchmarks indicate about performance?
What other
live performance data exist?
Are there
studies on screening's effect on the performance
of U.S. equities?
Table 2: Domini
400 Social Index Performance
Are there studies
on non-U.S. equity portfolios?
Are there
any studies on screened bond portfolios?
What conclusions
can be drawn about screened portfolio performance?
There's no doubt there
is an inherent contradiction between conservatism
and unfettered capitalism. Conservatives
ought to be worshiping at a higher altar
than the bottom line on a balance sheet.
What in heaven's name is it that we conservatives
want to conserve if not social stability
and family unity?
-- Patrick J. Buchanan (1995)*
The greatest area of controversy
about screened portfolios centers on their
performance. Proponents of a mission-based
investment policy must address performance
first generally and then specifically. In
the context of the institution's asset allocation
decisions, its manager searches, and its
monitoring of its portfolio managers.
Any discussion of a change
in investment strategy must include an examination
of the relative financial performance of
the vehicles under consideration. Mission-based
investing is no exception to that rule.
Indeed, socially responsible investing (SRI)
has endured some bad press on performance,
and proponents must anticipate questions
based on it.
The following sections present
brief responses to performance questions.
More detailed ones will be found in the
articles listed in the Resource Guide in
the Appendix, below.
Does
limiting one's investment universe limit
the return on a portfolio?
The Modern Portfolio Theory
holds that, in general, diversification
reduces risk and maximizes long-term returns.
Therefore, anything that limits an investor's
ability to diversify increases investment
risks unnecessarily. To eliminate, say,
tobacco company securities limits a manager's
ability to diversify into an industry that
may outperform the rest of the stock market.
This argument ignores the
fact that one hires a manager because s/he
is good at narrowing the universe of investable
options. And, Modern Portfolio Theory is
just that: a theory. Indeed, as discussed
below, some studies indicate that particular
screens do not impair portfolio performance.
Citations to these and others will be found
in the Resources appendix.
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What
do the benchmarks indicate about performance?
One benchmark, the Domini
400 Social Index (DSI), now exists for socially
screened portfolios made up of U.S. equities.
This 400 company index modeled on the Standard
& Poor's 500 (S&P 500) applies social screens
across nine areas. Launched on May 1, 1990,
it has outperformed the Standard & Poor's
500 from its inception through the end of
April 1998.
One should not draw conclusions
about future performance based on past performance.
In addition, the Domini 400 numbers do not
represent data from a full market cycle
-- from bull to bear to bull. The data only
cover a part of the post-1982 bull market.
What
other live performance data exist?
Experience with portfolios
only dates to 1970, the year a group of
Methodist clergy and laity launched the
Pax World Fund, a balanced fund. The first
pure equity fund to feature multiple screens
was the Dreyfus Third Century Fund, launched
in 1975.
Antedating Pax World and Dreyfus
Third Century were some mutual funds that
eliminated "sin stocks." The Pioneer Fund
has excluded tobacco and alcohol companies
for 50 years. An illustration supplied by
the Fund shows that $1,000 invested, when
the fund was launched on March 1, 1928,
would have been worth $5,780,117 on December
31, 1997. A similar investment in the S&P
500 would have yielded $1,190,147. The Fund's
average annual return for the period was
13.2 percent, while the S&P 500's was 10.67
percent.*
An interesting study by the
WM Company, a leading U.K. consultant to
charities and public authorities, compared
the performance of constrained (screened)
funds to that of its total U.K. Charity
Fund Universe. The constrained universe
consisted of 20 funds with a market value
of 822 million Pounds at the end of 1995.
The constraints were, by U.S. standards,
quite limited -- alcohol, tobacco, and armaments.
However, constrained funds comprised of
U.K. equities performed identically to unconstrained
funds over the four years ending with 1995;
constrained "overseas equities" underperformed
unconstrained by 0.1 percent. WM concluded:
The policy of excluding certain
ethically unacceptable sectors/stocks from
portfolios appears to have had little impact
over the period 1992-95. The performance
of Charity Funds following such an exclusion
appears little different, in aggregate,
from that of the Unconstrained Charity Universe.
Other constraints, in the form of income
requirements or asset mix, are more important
in performance terms.*
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Table
2. Domini 400 Social Index Performance
Rolling Average Annual Returns
| |
DSI 400 |
S&P 500 |
S&P MidCap |
12 months ending 8/31/98
|
11.42%
|
8.11%
|
-9.45%
|
24 months ending 8/31/98
|
26.23%
|
23.29%
|
11.44%
|
36 months ending 8/31/98
|
23.75%
|
21.76%
|
11.58%
|
60 months ending 8/31/98
|
19.33%
|
18.23%
|
11.85%
|
Sources: Wilshire Associates;
KLD Research & Analytics, Inc.
Are
there studies on screening's effect on the
performance of U.S. equities?
Yes. Some studies have indicated
that investors applying social criteria
need not expect to lose anything vis
a vis the broad market indexes. Appendix
D, Resources, provides starting points for
a literature review. The citation for the
articles discussed below will also be found
there.
In 1993, S. Hamilton, et
al., reported in Financial Analysts
Journal on their studies of socially
screened mutual funds. They concluded: "Investors
can expect to lose nothing by investing
in socially responsible mutual funds [when
compared to a benchmark of randomly selected
mutual funds]."
In 1995, M.A. Cohen, et
al., of Vanderbilt University reported
that between 1987 and 1989 Green investors,
who typically have quite stringent screening
criteria, did not seem "to pay a premium
for their convictions" as compared to the
S&P 500.
In a 1997 study in The
Journal of Forecasting, John B. Guerard,
Jr., then Director of Quantitative Research
for Vantage Global Advisers, reached a similar
conclusion. Guerard compared the performance
of Vantage's 1,300 company universe against
a subset of 950 that passed four major screens:
military; nuclear power; product exclusion
(alcohol, tobacco, and gambling); and environment.
Mr. Guerard found:
The Vantage Global Advisers'
unscreened . . . universe produced a 1.068
percent monthly average return during the
January 1987-December 1994 period, such
that a $1.00 investment grew to $2.77. A
corresponding investment in the socially-screened
universe would have grown to $2.74, representing
a 1.057 percent average monthly return. There is no statistically significant
difference in the respective return series.
More importantly, there is no economically
meaningful difference between the return
differential. (Emphasis added.)*
Articles collected in the
Winter 1997 Journal of Investing,
including one by Mr. Guerard, confirm his
conclusion. In "Additional Evidence on the
Cost of Being Socially Responsible," Mr.
Guerard concluded that the use of a broad
range of social screens produces a more
efficient portfolio than one that is only
divested of tobacco stocks. He found that
the use of environmental, product (alcohol,
tobacco and gambling), military, and nuclear
power screens produced portfolios with higher
excess returns than unscreened portfolios.
Of these screens in isolation, only the
military screen significantly diminished
returns between 1992 and 1997.
Top of Page
Are
there studies on non-U.S. equity portfolios?
Yes. ** In April
1998, Stephen Williams of the WM Company
submitted a masters thesis to the University
of Edinburgh illustrating various types
of "ethical indexes" modeled on existing Financial Times broad market gages.
These studies indicate performance similar
to the Domini 400 against the Standard &
Poor's 500.
Frank J. Travers of Oppenheimer
& Co. studied 23 screened portfolios which
he described as non-U.S. His Winter 1997
article in The Journal of Investing,
"Socially Responsible Investing on a Global
Basis: Mixing Money and Morality Outside
the U.S.," concludes that over the periods
he studied, these portfolios outperformed
Morgan Stanley's EAFE Index and produced
competitive returns to a universe of unrestricted
portfolios.
Are
there any studies on screened bond portfolios?
To date, the only study on
screened bond portfolios is one by Louis
D'Antonio, Tommi Johnsen, and Bruce Hutton
of the University of Denver. Their article,
"Expanding Socially Screened Portfolios:
An Attribution Analysis of Bond Performance"
appeared in the Winter 1997 issue of The
Journal of Investing.
They posed the question: could
one develop a bond index with screens identical
to the Domini 400's and, if so, how would
it perform? They concluded that an analogue
to the Lehman Corporate Bond Index could
be constructed based on the Domini 400's
constituent companies. As to performance,
they concluded:
A portfolio of bonds comprising
issues from firms represented in the Domini
400 performs comparably in terms of risk-return
to the Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond Index.
The SRI and LCB indexes are identical in
the exposures to term structures. There
is no significant difference between the
portfolios . . ..
While the active returns for
the SRI portfolio indicate that it outperformed
the LCB index on a simple return basis,
the premium appears to be related to differences
in credit risk. In general, our research
indicates that . . . there should be no
penalty [to socially responsible investors]
for following their social values after
adjusting for credit risk.*
Top of Page
What
conclusions can be drawn about screened
portfolio performance?
The performance of the Domini
400 and the results of the studies discussed
above shift the burden of proof to critics
to show that there are indeed "costs" to
social screening. Thus far there appears
to be little evidence that social screening
necessarily results in lost return. The
affirmative case for screened portfolios
has not yet been proven. Time and a full
market cycle will determine the "cost" question.
But, the ultimate questions remain unresolved:
- Do companies that pass the types of
screens described in this part perform
better as a portfolio than an unscreened
universe?
- Does social screening lead investors
to better companies than they would
find without applying them?
Late in 1992, BARRA published
an analysis of the performance of the Domini
400 Social Index versus that of the S&P
500. Its conclusions, in part, were that:
[The] bulk of the outperformance
[of the DSI versus the S&P] arises not from
the factor biases inherent in the introduction
of social screens, but from the specific
asset return itself. There is a specific
return premium to the index over this time
period which is presumably related to the
social screens KLD has developed, though
the 95% confidence level is not quite
statistically significant.* [Emphasis added.]
Whether this and similar preliminary
analyses will hold true remains to be seen.