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About Portfolio
Screening
Portfolio
screening: What is it?
Screened
portfolio investment: What can it accomplish?
Screened
portfolio Investment: Can it assure consistency
with mission?
Screened
portfolio investment: What issues can it touch?
Screened
portfolio investment: How and what does it communicate?
Screened portfolio
investment: What goes in the investment policy?
Screened
portfolio investment: Does divestment do any good?
Are there
studies on screening's effect on the performance
of U.S. equities?
Are there studies
on non-U.S. equity portfolios?
Are there
any studies on screened bond portfolios?
What conclusions
can be drawn about screened portfolio performance?
Portfolio
screening: What is it?
A screen is a criterion
used in the process of making an investment
decision. A screen may reflect the standards
of financial quality a potential investment
must meet. Or, it may reflect non-financial
criteria, such as a manager's specialization,
in, say, large capitalization companies
or Pacific Rim equities.
Screened portfolio
investing is the application of
social criteria (or social screens)
in investment decisions about conventional
investments, such as stocks, bonds,
and mutual funds. These criteria augment
the institution's financial criteria;
they should neither replace nor weaken
them.
A social screen is a non-financial criterion that augments
an investor's financial standards and
reflects the investor's social, ethical,
or religious concerns. In mission-based
investing, the institution's mission
defines the parameters for the social
screens. The effect, if any, on investment
performance of the application of particular
social screens remains an open question.
But in the authors' view, the evidence
-- index performance, fund performance,
scholarly studies -- appears to indicate
that social screening does not require
an institution to sacrifice performance. See Part VI, The Performance
of Screened Portfolios.
Screened
portfolio investment: What can it accomplish?
Portfolio screening has
two objectives: consistency and communication.
Thus:
- it can reassure an institution
that its investments are not working
contrary to it's mission, and
- it can serve as a means of communicating
and educating on issues central
to an institution's mission.
An example of the first
objective might be a foundation concerned
with land-use issues which found owning
shares in developers of agricultural
land, such as Wal-Mart and Home Depot,
inconsistent with its mission and decided
not to buy them. The second objective
is more subtle yet more important: to
make a public statement of its mission
in a financial context.
Screened
portfolio Investment: Can it assure
consistency with mission?
Not absolutely. Companies
change; so do institutions. In both
cases, change comes gradually, and an
inconsistency between mission and an
investment emerges slowly.
For instance, some years
passed between the first stories about
U.S. sportswear companies' subcontractors
in southeast Asia and the Archipelago
and decisions to divest companies such
as Nike. Because social investors recognize
that companies are not perfect, in such
situations they often try to work with
a company through dialogue or shareholder
actions for change. If they don't succeed,
they may divest in order to align their
portfolios and their values.
In the end, screening
works toward institutional consistency
but it cannot guarantee it. The
benefits from communication with the
public and the companies make the effort
worthwhile, even though the means are
less than perfect.
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Screened
portfolio investment: What issues can
it touch?
In certain areas, screening
can assure that an institution's domestic
investments are not inconsistent with
its mission. For example, a hospital
may regard profiting from tobacco as
at odds with its healthcare mission.
Harvard and Johns Hopkins reached this
conclusion, even though their overall
educational mission includes more than
health care.
It is relatively easy
to screen out the main companies in
the lines of business covered by the
exclusionary screens such as alcohol,
gambling, tobacco, military contracting,
nuclear power and firearms. The most
difficult questions involve tangential
businesses. Was 3M in the business of
selling tobacco when its outdoor advertising
subsidiary sold billboard space for
cigarette ads? Are groceries that sell
beer, snuff, and scratch tickets in
the business of selling alcohol and
tobacco products and gaming chances?*
Beyond the basic exclusionary
areas, screening becomes more difficult.
The exclusionary screens usually have
clear-cut answers: a company makes cigarettes
or it does not. For the other type of
screen -- qualitative screens -- a "yes"
or "no" is rarely an appropriate answer.
In these areas companies can have negatives
or positives or both.
Qualitative screens are
sometimes used affirmatively. Some institutions
seek to invest in companies that advance
their mission. An environmental group
might include in its investment guidelines
a preference for companies selling ecologically
sound products.
By their nature, qualitative
screens require a nuanced evaluation
of a company's performance. Evaluating
the relationship between a company and
the environment in which it operates
poses difficult questions for researchers
and investors. Qualitative screening
becomes harder if the companies are
multi-nationals or are not subject to
U.S. reporting requirements, thus limiting
the information available on their operations.
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Screened
portfolio investment: How and what does
it communicate?
Portfolio screening is
a means of communicating with an institution's
constituents and with companies.
Communications with constituents
usually occur in the process by which
the institution develops its screening
policy and then in periodic (usually
annual) reviews of the policy and its
results. This type of communication
is described above. Communication with
companies occurs in two contexts: first,
in the process of screening, itself;
and second, in specific instances where
a company's conduct is of concern.
In order to screen, an
investor needs information. Directly
or indirectly, the main source of that
information will often be the company
itself. Companies pay attention to the
requests and questions they get from
shareholders or potential investors.
They also heed the queries they receive
from research firms, because the questions
represent those of the firms' clients
who are primarily institutions.
In the context of mission-based
investing, companies certainly know
the social research firms and the clients
they represent. They are aware of and
respond to the issues that concern these
investors. To respond, of course, does
not imply a commitment to change. But
it does acknowledge receipt of the communication.
The information received by research
firms often goes into reports which
they provide to their clients. Most
research firms ask a report's subject
to review it before publication. Again,
the company hears what investors' concerns
are and has an opportunity to respond.
Investors who hire a manager
specializing in SRI or who buy a socially
screened mutual fund achieve the same
objectives when the manager or the fund
puts questions to a company. Of course,
investors have an on-going responsibility
to communicate their social concerns
to their managers or fund management.
Supervision on social issues should
not end with hiring. A 1998 survey by
the AFL-CIO revealed that two union
pension fund managers had failed to
follow substantive guidelines on how
to vote proxies.*
In out-of-the-ordinary
situations, an institution may feel
it must communicate directly with a
company. But, that end is not required,
even if the company fails to respond
satisfactorily. Options range from doing
nothing apart from registering displeasure
to filing a shareholder resolution.
The types of statements made through
screening or direct expressions of concern
let companies know the standards to
which they are being held. They affirm
for the public, an institution's constituencies,
and the institution itself the value
of its mission for society.
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Screened
portfolio investment: What goes in the
investment policy?
An investment policy is a written statement of an institution's
objectives for its portfolio. A policy
statement may include general guidance
for implementing social investment objectives.
The statement may simply require that
the institution's funds "be invested
consistently with our mission." Indeed,
statements of a mission-based policy
should be kept simple.
In most cases, a set of
working guidelines (usually devised
by a board's investment committee) will
amplify the general statement in the
investment policy. The working guidelines
might include:
- affirmative guidelines specifying
the types of policies and activities
the institution wishes to support;
- negative guidelines on products
and practices from which the institution
would prefer not to benefit; and
- exclusionary guidelines on what
types of companies should not be
considered for the portfolio.
Since managers will use
working guidelines in their day-to-day
decision-making, clear examples and
brightly drawn lines are important.
A few institutions require
managers to submit proposed buy lists
for screening. Others provide their
managers with restricted lists, the
names of companies whose securities
a manager may not buy. Still others
require their managers to work with
a screening consultant. But, most place
the responsibility for screening on
their managers.
Screened
portfolio investment: Does divestment
do any good?
Divestment -- the
selling of certain types of shares on
principle -- can be an end in itself
by bringing a portfolio into conformity
with an institution's mission. It can
also make a powerful statement.
Divestment affords institutions
an opportunity to educate their constituencies
and the public at large, just as the
American Medical Association has done
since it decided to divest its holdings
in tobacco companies. These educational
opportunities are ongoing. Each year
when a board reexamines, say, its policy
on alcoholic beverage manufacturers,
it has an opportunity to communicate
with its constituencies and the companies
in question.
The argument against divestment
is that it has no effect on the markets,
the divested companies' stock prices,
or their cost of capital. While essentially
true*, this argument misses
the point. Decisions made around divestment
alter how institutions and their stakeholders
discuss investments. Divestment can
also shift attitudes in the broader
world of investors, as it did on South
Africa.
Another argument against
divestment is that companies welcome
the departure of dissenting shareholders.
In some circumstances (e.g.,
South Africa) and with some industries
(e.g., gaming), remaining as
a shareholder offers fewer opportunities
to effect change than does joining the
chorus of investors refusing hold such
companies securities. That chorus is
heard well beyond Wall Street, on streets
where other types of pressures can be
applied. Hence, the importance of making
the statement. However, for companies,
such as Intel, which listen to shareholders
even when they dislike what they hear,
divestment usually isn't as good an
option as shareholder activism.
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Are
there studies on screening's effect
on the performance of U.S. equities?
Yes. Some studies have
indicated that investors applying social
criteria need not expect to lose anything vis a vis the broad market indexes.
Appendix D, Resources, provides starting
points for a literature review. The
citation for the articles discussed
below will also be found there.
In 1993, S. Hamilton, et al., reported in Financial
Analysts Journal on their studies
of socially screened mutual funds. They
concluded: "Investors can expect to
lose nothing by investing in socially
responsible mutual funds [when compared
to a benchmark of randomly selected
mutual funds]."
In 1995, M.A. Cohen, et al., of Vanderbilt University
reported that between 1987 and 1989
Green investors, who typically have
quite stringent screening criteria,
did not seem "to pay a premium for their
convictions" as compared to the S&P
500.
In a 1997 study in The
Journal of Forecasting, John B.
Guerard, Jr., then Director of Quantitative
Research for Vantage Global Advisers,
reached a similar conclusion. Guerard
compared the performance of Vantage's
1,300 company universe against a subset
of 950 that passed four major screens:
military; nuclear power; product exclusion
(alcohol, tobacco, and gambling); and
environment. Mr. Guerard found:
The Vantage Global Advisers'
unscreened . . . universe produced a
1.068 percent monthly average return
during the January 1987-December 1994
period, such that a $1.00 investment
grew to $2.77. A corresponding investment
in the socially-screened universe would
have grown to $2.74, representing a
1.057 percent average monthly return. There is no statistically significant
difference in the respective return
series. More importantly, there is no
economically meaningful difference between
the return differential. (Emphasis
added.)*
Articles collected in
the Winter 1997 Journal of Investing,
including one by Mr. Guerard, confirm
his conclusion. In "Additional Evidence
on the Cost of Being Socially Responsible,"
Mr. Guerard concluded that the use of
a broad range of social screens produces
a more efficient portfolio than one
that is only divested of tobacco stocks.
He found that the use of environmental,
product (alcohol, tobacco and gambling),
military, and nuclear power screens
produced portfolios with higher excess
returns than unscreened portfolios.
Of these screens in isolation, only
the military screen significantly diminished
returns between 1992 and 1997.
Are
there studies on non-U.S. equity portfolios?
Yes. ** In
April 1998, Stephen Williams of the
WM Company submitted a masters thesis
to the University of Edinburgh illustrating
various types of "ethical indexes" modeled
on existing Financial Times broad
market gages. These studies indicate
performance similar to the Domini 400
against the Standard & Poor's 500.
Frank J. Travers of Oppenheimer
& Co. studied 23 screened portfolios
which he described as non-U.S. His Winter
1997 article in The Journal of Investing,
"Socially Responsible Investing on a
Global Basis: Mixing Money and Morality
Outside the U.S.," concludes that over
the periods he studied, these portfolios
outperformed Morgan Stanley's EAFE Index
and produced competitive returns to
a universe of unrestricted portfolios.
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Are
there any studies on screened bond portfolios?
To date, the only study
on screened bond portfolios is one by
Louis D'Antonio, Tommi Johnsen, and
Bruce Hutton of the University of Denver.
Their article, "Expanding Socially Screened
Portfolios: An Attribution Analysis
of Bond Performance" appeared in the
Winter 1997 issue of The Journal
of Investing.
They posed the question:
could one develop a bond index with
screens identical to the Domini 400's
and, if so, how would it perform? They
concluded that an analogue to the Lehman
Corporate Bond Index could be constructed
based on the Domini 400's constituent
companies. As to performance, they concluded:
A portfolio of bonds comprising
issues from firms represented in the
Domini 400 performs comparably in terms
of risk-return to the Lehman Brothers
Corporate Bond Index. The SRI and LCB
indexes are identical in the exposures
to term structures. There is no significant
difference between the portfolios .
. ..
While the active returns
for the SRI portfolio indicate that
it outperformed the LCB index on a simple
return basis, the premium appears to
be related to differences in credit
risk. In general, our research indicates
that . . . there should be no penalty
[to socially responsible investors]
for following their social values after
adjusting for credit risk.*
What
conclusions can be drawn about screened
portfolio performance?
The performance of the
Domini 400 and the results of the studies
discussed above shift the burden of
proof to critics to show that there
are indeed "costs" to social screening.
Thus far there appears to be little
evidence that social screening necessarily
results in lost return. The affirmative
case for screened portfolios has not
yet been proven. Time and a full market
cycle will determine the "cost" question.
But, the ultimate questions remain unresolved:
- Do companies that pass the types
of screens described in this part
perform better as a portfolio than
an unscreened universe?
- Does social screening lead investors
to better companies than they would
find without applying them?
Late in 1992, BARRA published
an analysis of the performance of the
Domini 400 Social Index versus that
of the S&P 500. Its conclusions,
in part, were that:
[The] bulk of the outperformance
[of the DSI versus the S&P] arises not
from the factor biases inherent in the
introduction of social screens, but
from the specific asset return itself.
There is a specific return premium to
the index over this time period which
is presumably related to the social
screens KLD has developed, though the
95% confidence level is not quite
statistically significant.* [Emphasis added.]
Whether this and similar
preliminary analyses will hold true
remains to be seen.
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